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Abstract
This paper provides an empirical investigation of electoral participation and
communicative voting in 14 European countries. We estimate a multi-level voting
process where individuals face a participation decision (whether to vote or abstain)
and a voting decision (whether to vote strategically for a likely winner party or
as communicating for a sure loser party). Our main ndings can be summarized
as follows. First, individuals who are either independent or uninformed are less
likely to turnout. However, being both independent and uninformed does not
have any statistically signicant e¤ect on electoral participation. Thus, our results
question the empirical relevance of the swing voters curse theory in large elections.
Second, the probability of voting as communicating is positively related with the
level of education and the degree of dissatisfaction with the political system. Finally,
political preferences and institutional features characterizing the functioning of the
political system and of the media market have a signicant e¤ect both on electoral
participation and on the voting decision.
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1 Introduction
Elections are generally viewed as choice mechanisms in which voters are involved in a
decision process structured into two stages: they rstly decide whether to participate in
the election (participation decision) and, secondly, they choose whom to cast their vote
for (voting decision). In line with other studies (Deacon and Shapiro, 1975, Kahn and
Matsusaka, 1997, Degan and Merlo, 2007), we construct a unied empirical framework in
which both the participation decision and the voting decision are taken into account. We
then employ this framework to empirically investigate the recent theoretical literature
concerning the role of information on voter turnout (Matsusaka, 1995, Feddersen and
Pesendorfer, 1996, 1999) and the trade-o¤ between strategic and communicative motives
for voting (Piketty, 2000, Castanheira, 2003, Razin, 2003).
To clarify our terminology, while most of the voting literature uses the term strategic
voting to indicate the vote for a party di¤erent from the one most preferred by the
voter (e.g., McKelvey and Ordeshook, 1972), in the present paper we will use the terms
strategic votingand communicative votinga la Piketty:
Voters trade-o¤ two di¤erent motives when deciding how to vote: they care
about current decision-making (they are strategic), but they also care about
communicating their views about their most-preferred candidate so as to in-
uence future elections, by inuencing other voters opinion and/or party
positioning(Piketty, 2000, pg. 169).
We will thus refer to strategic votingas the vote for a likely winner party (indicating
that a voter cares more about current-decision making) and will instead refer to com-
municative votingas the vote for a sure loser party (indicating that a voter cares more
about future elections).
We model elections as a multi-level choice mechanism in which voters decide both
whether to vote and whom to vote for. We collect data from 14 European countries
and then employ several econometric techniques to test the validity of the empirical
structure underlying the electoral decision process that we propose. Specically, we
estimate multinomial logit, sequential logit and nested logit models and compare the
relative appropriateness of each of them to deal with the research questions of this study.
We evaluate how individual characteristics, the level of information, and expressive mo-
tivations inuence electoral participation. Further, given that people trade-o¤ strategic
and communicative motivations in the voting decision, we analyze the individual char-
acteristics that make a voter more likely to care greatly about the strategic part of this
trade-o¤ or, alternatively, about the communicative role of voting. At the same time,
we explore how institutional features, such as those dening the working of the political
system and the characteristics of the media market, inuence the participation and the
voting decision.
The evidence emerging from individual-level data regarding the role that information
plays on electoral participation calls into question the empirical relevance of the swing
voters curse theory of abstentionism in large elections (Feddersen and Pesendorfer, 1996,
1999). Individuals who are either independent or uninformed are less likely to turn out.
However, being independent and uninformed at the same time does not seem to have any
statistically signicant e¤ect on the turnout decision.
The evidence emerging from cross-country data on electoral participation and commu-
nicative voting shows that a lower level of media freedom, a higher threshold for political
representation, and a lower number of representatives for a given size of the electoral
district are all features leading to a lower turnout probability. On the other hand, lower
media freedom and a lower concentration of opposition parties is associated with a higher
probability of individuals voting as communicating.
Individual preferences a¤ect both electoral participation and voting decisions. Indi-
viduals whose ideologically-closer party is a likely winner, as well as those who consider
politics important and those who have a good opinion of the political system of their
country, are more likely to turn out and are also more likely to vote for a likely winner
party.
On the other hand, left-wing extremists are more likely to vote for their most preferred
party regardless of whether this party is a sure loser. In contrast, right-wing extremists
are very strategic (even more strategic than moderate voters). Moreover, our results also
show that better-educated people are more likely to vote as communicating, rather than
strategically. This evidence seems to suggest that communicative voting indeed reects
forward-looking behavior.
Finally, individual preferences play a role in how institutional characteristics a¤ect
electoral participation and communicative voting. The features of the electoral system
and the structure of the media market of a country have di¤erent e¤ects on the behavior of
di¤erent individuals. When focusing on the subsample of individuals whose ideologically-
closer party is a likely winner, we observe that a higher level of media concentration
leads to a higher level of electoral participation and a lower probability of voting as
communicating. On the other hand, when we analyze the subsample of individuals whose
ideologically-closer party is a sure loser, we observe that a lower level of media freedom and
a lower level of concentration of opposition parties decreases the probability of electoral
participation and increases the probability of communicative voting.
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1.1 Related Literature
Our study is related to two di¤erent strands of literature. The rst is the theoretical and
empirical literature on voter turnout and, more specically, on the e¤ect of information
on electoral participation. Participation in mass elections is a typical collective action
problem: in large elections, the probability that a voter will cast a decisive ballot is not
signicantly di¤erent from zero. A vast literature has emerged trying to explain why peo-
ple still decide to turn out.1 The most recent theories on the determinants of electoral
participation have focused on the role of information, both in a decision-theoretic (Mat-
susaka, 1995) and in a game-theoretic framework (Feddersen and Pesendorfer, 1996 and
1999). The decision-theoretic approach predicts that, since the more condent a voter
is about voting for the best candidate, the higher is her expected benet from voting,
more informed voters are more likely to turn out (Matsusaka, 1995). On the other hand,
by endogenizing the individual probability of being pivotal, Feddersen and Pesendorfer
(1996) show that politically independent and uninformed voters su¤er from the swing
voters curse, i.e., they are better o¤ by abstaining than by voting for any of the com-
peting candidates even when the cost of voting is zero. Specically, in the presence of
costless voting, both independent informed and partisan voters have a dominant strategy
of turning out to the polls. In contrast, uninformed independent voters vote to compen-
sate for the [presence of] partisans and having achieved that compensation they abstain
(Feddersen and Pesendorfer, 1996, pg. 414). The swing voters curse theory implies that,
ceteris paribus, uninformed independent voters are less likely to turn out than informed
independent and partisan voters.2
Recent empirical studies on electoral participation have focused on the relationships
between information and turnout. Lassen (2005) uses data from a natural experiment
where a random fraction of the electorate is exogenously informed and nds that better-
informed voters are more inclined to vote in a referendum setting. Degan andMerlo (2007)
show that, since uninformed voters are more uncertain about the optimal candidate,
their expected regret from voting is higher and therefore they are less likely to turn
out. While analyzing the role of information on the individual decision to turn out,
however this literature has not taken into consideration the role of political preferences.
The evidence regarding the positive correlation between information and turnout can
thus be explained by both decision-theoretic and game-theoretic models. There are two
exceptions. Larcinese (2009) analyzes the e¤ect of information and ideological strength
1See Dhillon and Peralta (2002) and Feddersen (2004) for extensive surveys on the theoretical litera-
ture on votersturnout.
2Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1999) generalize this model to allow for a continuum of voterspreferences
and a nestate space. They show that in such case the level of abstention should be closer to zero.
Nevertheless, in presence of a more realistic coarsestate space the more general model can produce
the same comparative statics as in the 1996 paper(Feddersen, 2004, pg 105).
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on voter turnout. In line with our results, he nds that being informed and at the
same time having more extreme preferences does not have any signicative e¤ect on
the voters probability of turning out. Since he excludes independent voters from his
analysis, however, it does not constitute an appropriate test of the swing voters curse
theory. Moreover, Larcinese focuses only on Britain, while we provide a test of the
swing voters curse both within and across di¤erent countries and di¤erent electoral
systems. The only study that has so far tried to directly test the swing voters curse
is the experimental work by Battaglini et al. (2009). The evidence emerging in this
context favors the game-theoretic approach on the e¤ect of information on turnout. The
authors show that individuals that are independent and uninformed strategically abstain
and that they take into account the presence of partisan bias in their decision to turn
out. Our study represents the rst empirical analysis aimed at directly testing the swing
voters curse theory using eld data both on the level of information and on the political
preferences of individuals. While the results of Battaglini et al. (2009) seem to suggest
that individuals do take into account their probability of being pivotal in the presence of
a small number of voters (e.g., in a committee), the results of our empirical analysis are
more in line with the predictions of decision-theoretic models of electoral participation.3
Hence, our results seem to question the empirical relevance of the swing voters curse
theory in large elections.
The second strand of literature that our paper relates to is the theoretical and empirical
literature on communicative voting. Once an individual has decided to participate in the
election, she has to choose whom to cast her vote for. If voters care only about current
decision-making, sure loser parties should not receive any votes in equilibrium. This
intuitive result seems to conict with simple empirical observation: sure loser parties
and candidates have been able to reach signicant vote shares even in rst-past-the-
post systems such as those present in the US and in the UK. These considerations have
lead several scholars to depart from traditional voting models, where voters are always
strategic, to analyze the role of voting as a way to convey information to other voters and
parties. The key idea of this literature is that, even if in a one-period election we should
only observe strategic voting (i.e., individuals only casting their votes for parties with a
positive probability of winning), broadening the time span of the voters objective function
may lead to di¤erent results. While Piketty (2000) explores the way communicative voting
inuences other voters, Castanheira (2003) proposes a model where rational individuals
may vote for sure loser parties in order to inuence the platforms of main parties.4 In a
3For a parallel result, see also Coate et al. (2009) on the performance of pivotal-voter models in small
scale elections.
4In the same vein, Razin (2003) points out that voters signal their private information by voting. In
this perspective, a winning candidate responds to the information elicited by the vote signal by recrafting
her policies and therefore by positioning more e¤ectively in the next campaign.
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multi-period model, both extremist voters and core voters may want to vote for extremist
parties in order to alter the beliefs of main parties and therefore their future platforms.
Core voters may be tempted to mimic extremist voters the closer the platforms proposed
by the main parties are.5
Franklin, Niemi and Whitten (1992) provide an empirical analysis of instrumental tac-
tical voting and expressive tactical voting, where the former indicates strategic voting by
individuals whose most-preferred party has no chance of winning and the latter represents
communicative voting by individuals casting their vote for a loser party di¤erent from
their preferred focal party. By analyzing individual data on the 1987 British election,
they nd that instrumental tactical voting is positively related with the margin of victory
of the two main parties, while expressive tactical voting shows a negative relationship.
Expressive tactical voting is also positively related with being indi¤erent among which of
the main parties would win, and with the level of education. Both kinds of tactical voting
appear to be positively related with the strength of partisanship. Degan and Merlo (2007)
model the behavior of voters in a two-stage optimization problem. In the rst stage, the
voter chooses whether to participate in the election. In the second stage, conditional on
participating, the voter decides whom to cast her vote for. The focus of the analysis is
on split-ticket voting, where individuals vote for di¤erent parties/candidates in di¤erent
elections (i.e., a Republican candidate in presidential elections and a Democrat candi-
date in congressional elections and vice-versa) to evaluate the extent to which sincere
voting a¤ects the electoral choice of voters. Their work brings about several interesting
results relevant for our study. First, only a small fraction of split-ticket voting (about
20% on average in the elections investigated) can be explained by sincere voting, since
other considerations, such as the desire to balance the government (Fiorina, 1990, Alesina
and Rosenthal, 1996), may also play a signicant role in inducing voters to split their
ticket. Second, independent voters split their ticket more than partisan voters. Third,
uninformed voters split their ticket more than informed voters. Fourth, the distribution of
the fraction of split-ticket voters on the liberal-conservative ideological space reveals that
sincere split-ticket voters account for those voters displaying more moderate positions.
Our paper contributes to this literature by analyzing the determinants of communica-
tive voting both within and across di¤erent countries and di¤erent electoral systems.
Hence, we provide an empirical investigation of the individual and institutional charac-
teristics behind the individual decision to vote as communicating.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the electoral decision process.
Section 3 presents the data. Section 4 presents our empirical strategy and discusses the
empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
5Castanheira (2003) argues that this may explain why some of the voters of extremist parties may
not be real extremists but rather use this instrument to warn main parties, in other words, they use
communicative voting (they would probably stop voting for extremists if they become too important).
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2 The Electoral Decision Process
We propose two alternative specications of the electoral decision process faced by the
individual. The rst is a two-stage decision process where the individual makes a par-
ticipation and a voting decision. The second is characterized by a three-stage structure
where, prior to making the above two electoral decisions, the individual takes into account
the fact that her preferred party is either a likely winner or a sure loser.
The two-stage electoral choice mechanism is described by Figure 1. In the rst stage,
the individual decides whether to participate in the political process or to abstain. In the
second stage, conditional on having decided to participate, the voter chooses whom to vote
for. The voter may either vote as communicating for a sure loser party, or strategically
for a likely winner party.
[Figure 1 about here]
The three-stage electoral choice mechanism takes into account the fact that individuals
face di¤erent choice sets depending on whether their preferred party is a potential winner
or a sure loser. Figure 2 illustrates the voters decision process embedding the ex-ante
distinction in the choice sets that di¤erent individuals face.6
[Figure 2 about here]
In the rst stage the individual, given her political bliss point, observes the shelves of
political o¤erand determines her choice set. In other words, she realizes whether the
party whose platform is closer to her preferred policy is a likely winner party. We dene
as closer to a sure loser party (CSLP) those individuals whose most preferred party is
a sure loser. Instead, individuals whose preferred party is a potential winner are dened
as closer to a likely winner party (CLWP). In the second stage, given her choice set,
the individual decides whether to participate in the political process or abstain. Finally,
in the third stage, conditional on having decided to participate, the voter decides whom
to cast her vote for. Put di¤erently, in the third stage the voter chooses whether to vote
strategically (i.e., vote for a likely winner party) or as communicating (i.e., vote for a
sure loser party). The three-stage decision process is thus characterized by a rst stage
that represents an exogenous constraint, since the individual does not actually make any
choice. Assuming that the voter is endowed with a given political bliss point and that
she cannot inuence the loser-winner distribution of parties in a given country at a given
time, we can think as if the choice set of each voter was chosen by nature.
6It may appear odd that an individual ideologically closer to a likely winner party votes for a sure
loser one. However as shown by Casthaneira (2003), moderate voters may nd sometimes optimal to
mimic extremist ones (for example because the party platform is moving far away with respect to the
individual preferred policy).
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Therefore, the three-choice decision process allows us to analyze separately the electoral
behavior of the two subsamples of CSLP and CLWP voters, in order to consider the
di¤erent incentives and constraints that CSLP and CLWP individuals face in their voting
decisions.
3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
3.1 Data
The data that we use in this study are drawn from a variety of sources. We focus
our empirical investigation on the analysis of the electoral behavior of 16,500 voters
interviewed by the World Values Survey association (henceforth WVS) in 14 European
countries between the end of 1999 and the beginning of 2000. Appendix 1 contains a
complete description of all the data used in our analysis and the list of countries under
investigation.
3.1.1 Dependent Variables
Electoral Participation. To describe the voters participation decision we considered the
following question contained in the WVS: Which party (if any) would you vote tomor-
row?Respondents were given the possibility of answering the question by indicating the
party they would vote or by asserting that they would not vote or would cast a blank vote.
Therefore, to assess whether an individual would abstain in an election, we constructed
a binary dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if she would not vote or cast a blank
vote in the election and the value of 0 if she would vote for one of the competing parties.
One limitation of using survey data is that the sample turnout rate may di¤er from the
actual one. In our data the overall sample turnout is 82.7%, while the average of the
actual turnout in the two elections closest to the survey is 77%. This di¤erence between
the self-reported turnout rate and the actual one is in line or even lower than previous
studies. The main potential problem arising from having a non-representative sample is
the possibility of obtaining biased regression coe¢ cients. However, vote validation stud-
ies also suggest that the presence of such a discrepancy has no signicant e¤ect on the
empirical results.7 Moreover, excluding the countries where the di¤erence between the
self-reported and actual turnout rates is higher then 10% from our sample did not have
any signicant e¤ect on our results.8
Communicative Voting. In order to construct a variable that embodies the trade-
o¤ between strategic and communicative motivations in the voting decision, we must
7See Matsusaka and Palda (1999) for a discussion of this issue.
8See Table A4.1 in the appendix for the regression results obtained from the subsample of countries
with low discrepancy between sample and actual turnout rates.
8
distinguish between parties considered as likely winners and those perceived as sure losers.
Since in most European countries the electoral system entails proportional representation,
our discriminator for classifying a party as a likely winneror a sure loseris not given
by its dimension (i.e., share of votes). Rather, by using the information contained in
Koole and Katz (2000), we make such a classication depending on whether a given
party in 1999 was perceived by voters as a party with the potential to participate in a
government coalition. More specically, likely winnerparties are dened as being those
belonging and/or supporting a government coalition or those belonging to a coalition
that opposes the government and represents a potential and credible alternative to the
governing coalition. In contrast, sure loserparties are the ones with no chance of being
in a winning coalition. This classication allows us to generate a binary dummy variable
taking the value of 1 if the party that the individual would vote for is a sure loser and
the value of 0 if it is a likely winner.
Closer to a sure loser partyvs. Closer to a likely winner party(CSLP vs. CLWP).
In order to classify individuals according to whether their ideologically-closer party was
a sure loser or a likely winner, we combined the information drawn from three di¤erent
data sources. First, we used WVS data to take the self-reported positions of individuals
on a single-dimensional political space structured in a 10-point political scale, where 1
indicates the extreme left and 10 the extreme right. Second, we used the Marks and
Steenbergen (1999) party dataset to assess the positions held by political parties on the
Left-Right political spectrum in each country included in our analysis. Finally, to dis-
tinguish between parties considered as likely winners from those sure losers, we took the
information contained in Koole and Katz (2000). These three di¤erent pieces of infor-
mation were then combined to determine which party was the closest to the preferences
of each individual in our sample and whether it was a likely winner or a sure loser party.
We were thus able to construct a binary dummy variable for being CSLP, taking the
value of 1 if the party whose ideological position was closer to the one self-reported by
the individual was a sure loser and 0 if it was a likely winner.9
3.1.2 Independent Variables
Individual Characteristics of Voters. In order to analyze the determinants of voter turnout
and communicative voting, we included several individual-level explanatory variables.
Along with the usual demographics such as age and gender, we added variables indicating
9Obviously, relying on such self-reported political preferences implies implicitly assuming that all
individuals have the same mapping between political preferences and numbers on the 10-point left-right
spectrum. This constitutes a very strong assumption behind the three-stage electoral choice model and
thus represents a potential source of measurement errors. Nevertheless, as long as the measurement
error is small, the three-stage model may bring additional insights to the analysis not captured by the
benchmark model (two-stage model).
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education level, income, and the marital and employment status of respondents as proxies
that dened socioeconomic status.
We also included two variables meant to capture the idiosyncratic level of interest and
the beliefs of each individual regarding the value of political participation. These are
the extent to which an individual believes that politics is important and how good she
considers the working of the political system in her country.10
Information and Political Preferences. In order to test for the empirical relevance of the
swing voters curse theory we focused on the questions contained in the WVS regarding
the level of information and the political preferences of individuals. First, we constructed
a proxy of the individuals level of information about politics by classifying an individual
as uninformed when she does not follow politics in the news. Then, we created a variable
indicating whether the individual is moderate (when her ideological preferences are close
to the median of the left-right political space) or independent (when she does not have an
ideological position on the left-right political space) in order to have a proxy of the swinger
quality of the individual. Finally, we computed the interaction term between these two
variables. Controlling for being uninformed and independent if the swing voters curse
theory holds true, we should observe that this interaction term is positively correlated
with the probability of abstaining.
We should point out that in general it is di¢ cult to draw sound conclusions about the
causal relationship on being uninformed and deciding not to participate in the voting
process. As observed by Lassen (2005):
The problem is that information acquisition is endogenous and, therefore,
both the decision to vote and the decision to obtain an education or become
informed about political issues can be caused by some third, unobservable,
factor. Hence, to make a statement about causal e¤ects in order to empiri-
cally evaluate the theoretical work, it is necessary to address the endogeneity
problem(Lassen, 2005, pg. 104).
In other words, if the information variable is endogenous, then the econometric rela-
tionship between voting and information may simply represent a correlation rather than
a casual link. Nevertheless, we argue that such an endogeneity problem is not worrisome
for the validity of our results. First of all, our dataset was constructed on the basis
of a general survey rather than an election poll. This implies that, since the informa-
tion collected is not specically related to a given election, the individual decision to be
10Usually, these kind of expressivevariables rise concerns due to the possible presence of endogeneity
(see Matsusaka and Palda, 1999). However, the two variables that we consider in our analysis capture the
idiosyncratic beliefs rather than actionsof an individual regarding politics. Hence, such endogeneity
problem does not seem to apply to our case. Moreover, as shown by Table 3, excluding these variables
from our empirical analysis does not have any signicant e¤ect on our results.
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informed about political issues is not determined by the decision of participating in a
specic voting process. Moreover (and more importantly), even if information were to
be endogenous, if the swing voters curse theory holds we should still observe a positive
correlation between being independent and uninformed and the probability of abstaining.
Therefore, although we cannot exclude the presence of such an endogeneity problem, our
results are not a¤ected by it.
Country-Level Statistics. Since the electoral behavior of voters may be a¤ected by
country-level variables that dene the working of political institutions and the function-
ing of the media system, we collected information that relate to these two dimensions
of the European countries under investigation. We gathered data on the electoral sys-
tems from the international IDEA Handbook of Electoral System Design (2004). Other
variables such as the Herndahl index of opposition parties, the mean magnitude of an
electoral district, the presence of a winner-takes-all system and the threshold for politi-
cal representation were collected from the Database of Political Institutions (DPI) of the
World Bank (Beck, Keefer and Clarke, 2004). At the same time, we included two variables
to account for the impact of the countrys media system on voting behavior: an index of
media freedom taken from the report Press Freedom 1994-2001, released by Freedom
House and, the Herndahl Index of media concentration drawn from Sanchez-Tabernero
(2004).
3.2 Descriptive Statistics
In Tables 1 and 2 we provide a preliminary description of our variables of interest. Specif-
ically, Table 1 displays the di¤erences in terms of individual characteristics between the
samples of voters and non-voters in the 14 European countries under investigation.
[Table 1 about here]
On average, individuals who decide to participate in the election seem to give more
importance to politics and have a better opinion of the working of the political system
as compared to non-voters. This suggests that idiosyncratic characteristics may play an
important role in electoral participation. Further, in line with the swing voters curse
theory, individuals who do not participate in the voting process are generally less informed
about politics and have more moderate political preferences than those who decide to vote.
Moreover, voters seem also to earn, on average, higher levels of incomes than non-voters.
This indicates that the potential private benets from voting are likely to a¤ect electoral
participation.
Table 2 reports the individual characteristics of strategic and communicative voters,
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respectively.
[Table 2 about here]
The t-test for di¤erences in means suggests that individuals voting for a sure loser party
seem to have, on average, a worse opinion regarding the working of the political system
than those who vote for a likely winner party. This suggests the presence of the so-called
protest voting, i.e., people decide to vote for a sure loser party as a signal to express
their dissatisfaction with the functioning of the political system. Communicative voters
seem also to be generally more educated and more likely to be politically extremists.
Further, individuals whose ideologically-closer party is a sure loser are, on average, less
inclined to vote for a likely winner party. Such a di¤erence may be explained by the fact
that sincere voting is one of the driving forces in the voting decision.
4 Electoral Participation and Communicative Voting
in Europe
Di¤erent empirical models may be specied to represent the two alternative electoral
decision processes specied in section 2. The rst one is a multinomial logit (ML) model
where the individual, rather than facing the participation and voting choices sequentially,
take them both at once. Thus, the rst and second stages belong to a single decision
stage, where individuals have three di¤erent potential choices: they can abstain, vote for
a likely winner party (strategic voting), or vote for a sure loser party (communicative
voting). We performed a Small-Hsiao test of the underlying Independence of Irrelevant
Alternatives (IIA) assumption of this multinomial logit model. The ML fails the test
for the IIA assumption both in the two-stage and three-stage electoral choice models,
suggesting that the individual decision process is indeed sequential. The results of the
fully specied Small-Hsiao tests are reported in Tables A2.1, A2.2 and A2.3 in Appendix
2. Given the results of the Small-Hsiao tests, we propose and estimate two alternative
models: a sequential logit model (SL) and a nested logit model (NL). That is, we estimate
the probabilities of electoral participation and communicative voting, respectively, using
both SL and NL models. More specically, the probability of abstaining for individual i
in country j is:
pAbsti;j = 1IND
Abst
i + 2INSTj + 3MEDIAj + 4Xi + "i;j; (1)
and the probability of voting as communicating for individual i in country j is:
pCommi;j = 1IND
Comm
i + 2INSTj + 3MEDIAj + 4Xi + ui;j; (2)
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where INDAbsti ; IND
Comm
i are vectors of individual characteristics a¤ecting her decision
to turn out and to vote as communicating, respectively; INSTj is a vector of variables
embedding the features of the electoral system of country j; MEDIAj is a vector of
variables capturing the characteristics of the media industry in country j and Xi is
a vector of control variables incorporating individual demographic and socioeconomic
characteristics such as age, gender, size of the urban area where the individual lives,
employment and marital status.
In section 4.1 we present and discuss the results of the estimates of electoral participa-
tion (i.e., of equation 1) both in a SL model and NL models. In section 4.2., we present
and discuss the results of the estimates of communicative voting (i.e., of equation 2).
Again, the empirical analysis is implemented employing both SL and NL models.
4.1 Electoral Participation
Table 3 shows the estimation results on the determinants of abstention in the two-stage
electoral choice model for the SL and NL models. In Table 4 we report the marginal
e¤ects of the explanatory variables on abstention for the fully specied versions of the
same two models.
[Tables 3 and 4 about here]
4.1.1 Information and electoral participation: a test of the swing voters
curse
As far as the e¤ect of information on voters turnout is concerned, being uninformed
increases the probability of not voting. Similarly, moderate or independent individuals
are less likely to turn out. However, the interaction term indicating whether the individual
is uniformed and moderate/independent is not statistically signicant. These results seem
to suggest that being at the same time uninformed and moderate/independent does not
a¤ect the individuals decision to turn out, but rather that both characteristics contribute
to a di¤erent extent to the choice of whether to vote or abstain. Such results are robust
to all of the di¤erent specications of our empirical model and to di¤erent classications
of uninformed and swing voters (see table A3.1 in Appendix 3).11 Consequently, our
empirical ndings call into question the empirical relevance of the swing voters curse
theory in large elections. Nevertheless, we believe that our results are not necessarily
contradictory with the ones obtained by Battaglini et al. (2009) on the empirical relevance
of the swing voters curse in an experimental context.12 In our view, the overall evidence
11The results are also robust to alternative denitions of moderatevoters (i.e., close to the median
or the mean of the distribution of party positions in the country where the individual votes). These
additional robustness checks results are available upon request to the authors.
12Battaglini et al. (2009) test the swing voters curse with a limited number of individuals involved
in the lab experiment (i.e., N=14).
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provided by our paper and that of those authors seems to suggest that, while in the
presence of a limited number of voters (e.g., in a committee), individuals do take into
account their pivotal probabilities, and thus their behavior is correctly captured by the
swing voters curse, in large elections this is not necessarily true anymore. Indeed, our
results are consistent with the empirical predictions on the e¤ect of information on turnout
implied by decision-theoretic models of voting behavior (Matsusaka, 1995). Hence, our
empirical ndings may simply imply that in large elections decision-theoretical models
may be able to capture the behavior of voters better than game-theoretical models.13
On the other hand, our specication constitutes a more appropriate and more specic
test for the empirical relevance of the swing voters curse with respect to Larcinese
(2009). Indeed, Larcinese does not control for the behavior of independent voters. We
instead explicitly take this into account and perform several sensitivity analyses to test
for various specication of informativeness and swingquality of voters (see table A3.1
in Appendix 3). Moreover, Larcinese focuses only on Britain, while we investigate the
empirical relevance of the swing voters curse both across and within di¤erent countries
and di¤erent electoral systems. Hence, his empirical ndings, while consistent with our
results, do not constitute an appropriate and comprehensive test of the swing voters
curse.
4.1.2 The Role of Political Institutions and the Media Market
Country-level characteristics seem to play an important role in the voters decision of
whether to participate in elections. Specically, we nd that a reduction in the level of
freedom in the media has a negative e¤ect on turnout. This evidence is consistent with the
idea that higher levels of political control over the media a¤ect the political accountability
of parties and muddle up the overall functioning of the democracy (Besley, Burgess and
Prat, 2002). At the same time, this result is also supportive of the informational theories
on electoral participation which suggest that, in the presence of more noisyinformation,
individual incentives to turn out decrease (Matsusaka, 1995, Feddersen and Pesendorfer,
1999).
Some institutional characteristics also seem to have a signicant e¤ect on the partici-
pation decisions. A higher threshold for representation reduces voter participation in the
election. More specically, a 1% increase in this threshold decreases turnout by 0.4% to
1% depending on the specication. District magnitude also a¤ects the turnout probabil-
ity: the higher the number of representatives for a given size of the electoral district, the
more likely that an individual will turn out (an increase of one standard-deviation in this
number increases electoral participation by 1%).
13Notice that this conclusion is consistent with the recent results of Coate et al. (2009) on the perfor-
mance of pivotal-voter models in small scale elections.
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As an additional robustness check, we also analyze the role that di¤erent electoral sys-
tems have on electoral participation. The following table shows the results on abstention
in the di¤erent subsamples of countries sharing the same electoral system: i.e., First Past
the Post (FPTP), Mixed Member System (MMS), Two Rounds System (TRS), Single
Transferable Vote (STV) and Proportional (PR).
[Table 5 about here]
In the case of FPTP, TRS and STV, the subsamples contain a limited number of observa-
tions and thus the regressions do not provide consistent estimates.14 Nevertheless, we can
see that the signs of the main explanatory variables are homogeneous across di¤erent elec-
toral systems. Being moderate or independent and uninformed is still not statistically
signicatively correlated with the probability of abstaining across and within di¤erent
electoral systems, bringing additional support to our negative result of the empirical rel-
evance of the swing voters curse in large elections. Moreover, in the cases of MMS and
PR, where the number of observations is su¢ ciently large to have consistent estimates,
the overall results are in line with what we have found when pooling all the observations
from di¤erent countries and electoral systems together (see Table 3). Moreover, in order
to better explore the role of country-level variables on electoral participation, we also
perform an empirical analysis taking into account heterogeneity in media market char-
acteristics and of institutional characteristics within countries sharing a PR system of
representation. The following table reports the results of this empirical specication:
[Table 6 about here]
As we can see, as in the case where all the countries with di¤erent electoral systems
were taken into account, when we restrict our attention to individuals living in a coun-
try with a proportional system, a higher level of media freedom and a higher number
of representatives for a given size of the electoral district leads to a higher level of elec-
toral participation. On the other hand, in countries with a proportional system, the
concentration of opposition parties also seems to play a role. An increase in one standard
deviation in the concentration of opposition parties increases the probability of electoral
participation by 2.4%.15
14Moreover, since in our sample the FPTP system is present only in United Kingdom, the STV only
in Ireland and the TRS only in France, it is not possible to separate the e¤ect of a given electoral system
from the country xed e¤ect.
15Notice that the winner-takes-all dummy is still present in Tables 6 and 11 since the Database
of Political Institutionsclassies in 2000 Spain and Greece as having at the same time a Proportional
System of Representation and a winner-takes-all one. Indeed, Spain had a majoritarian system for the
senate and Greece had a reinforced PR system (i.e., majority premium to the most elected party).
Nevertheless, dropping this variable or dropping Spain and Greece from the sample do not a¤ect our
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4.1.3 The Role of Individual Preferences
Voters having a good opinion of the political system operating in their country as well
as those who think that politics is important are more likely to vote. Therefore, in
line with the empirical literature on electoral participation (e.g., Coate et al., 2009),
our results bring additional empirical support to the idea that expressivemotivations
play an important role in the individuals decision to turn out (Downs, 1957, Riker and
Ordeshook, 1968, Fiorina, 1976).
The results from Table 3 also show that individuals whose ideologically-closer party
is a sure loser are less likely to vote. More specically, being closer to a sure loser
party decreases the probability of electoral participation by 3.2% to 4.3%, depending on
the empirical specication. This result suggests that voters do take into account their
expected benet from voting when deciding whether or not to do so (Riker and Ordeshook,
1968). In order to better explore the role of political preferences on electoral participation
and to understand how such preferences interact with institutional characteristics, we
report the results of the three-stage electoral choice model in Table 7. Specically, we
consider the empirical results regarding the determinants of electoral participation for the
subsamples of individuals closer to a sure loser party (CSLP) and closer to a likely
winner party(CLWP), respectively.
[Table 7 about here]
First of all, we should notice that most of the results on individual-specic variables of the
two-stage electoral choice model also hold true in the modied structure of the electoral
decision process that takes into account the fact that individuals face di¤erent choice sets
depending on whether their most preferred party is a likely winner (CLWP voters) or a
sure loser (CSLP voters).
With respect to the country-level characteristics lower thresholds for representation
and a higher number of elected representatives for a given size of the electoral district
are both conducive to higher turnout probabilities for both CSLP and CLWP voters
(as in the previous two-stage electoral choice model). On the other hand, media market
characteristics have di¤erent e¤ects on the electoral behavior of CSLP and CLWP voters.
A lower level of media freedom negatively a¤ects the probability of electoral participation
only for individuals closer to a sure loser party. On the other hand, a higher level of
concentration in media ownership seems to be positively correlated with the probability
of electoral participation by individuals closer to a likely winner party. This result is in line
with the ndings of Oberholzer-Gee andWaldfogel (2005) about a political mobilization
e¤ect due to the structure of media markets. Since the media market is characterized by
results on electoral participation and communicative voting.
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xed costs and economies of scale, a more concentrated media market is more e¤ective
at reaching large groups. Therefore, candidates nd it easier to mobilize voters. For the
same reason, we can think that a more concentrated media market will lower the cost
that individuals have to incur in order to learn candidate positions and thus increase the
probability of turnout (Matsusaka, 1995, Oberholzer-Gee and Waldfogel, 2005). Finally,
a higher concentration of opposition parties increases the probability of turnout of CSLP
voters.
4.2 Communicative Voting
We now turn our attention to Communicative Voting. In Table 8 we report the empirical
results regarding the determinants of communicative voting and in Table 9 we report
the marginal e¤ects of the explanatory variables on communicative voting for the fully
specied SL and NL models.
[Tables 8 and 9 about here]
4.2.1 Who votes for losers?
The results on communicative voting show that better-educated people seem to be more
likely to vote as communicating rather than strategically. This result, may be surprising
at rst, since we may have expected more educated people to make the rational choice
of not voting for a sure loser party. However, as the recent literature on communicative
voting shows, the vote for loser parties could be explained in an entirely rational frame-
work. A possible interpretation of this result may indeed lie in the higher awareness that
better-educated individuals have on the communicative role of their vote. In other words,
voters with a higher educational level better understand that by voting as communicat-
ing they can inuence other individuals (Piketty, 2000) or the political platforms of likely
winner parties (Castanheira, 2003). Hence, voting as communicating may indeed reect
forward-looking behavior.
On the other hand, uninformed individuals are also more likely to vote as communi-
cating. This result, though it may seem to run counter to the positive e¤ect of education
on communicative voting, should be interpreted in the light of the fact that uniformed
individuals may vote for a sure loser party simply because they are badly informed on
the political chances of the party they support.
Finally, voters with a negative attitude towards the working of the political system
operating in their own country are more likely to vote as communicating. This nding
seems to reveal that voters dissatised with the way their political system functions are
more likely to vote for sure loser parties (what is generally referred in political science as
protest voting).
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4.2.2 The Role of Political Institutions and the Media Market
Country-level institutional variables also seem to have a signicant impact on commu-
nicative voting. The lower the freedom of the media, the more likely the voter casts
her vote for a sure loser party (a decrease in one standard deviation in media freedom
increases the probability of communicative voting by 2.2%). We might interpret this
result as a case of protest voting. The greater the concentration of the parties belonging
to the opposition, the less likely individuals will vote for losers (i.e., an increase in one
standard deviation in the concentration of opposition parties decreases the probability
of communicative voting by 2.1%). This seems to suggest that if opposition parties are
more fragmented (i.e., less concentrated), it is more likely that a loser party may receive a
signicative amount of votes and may thus sooner or later enter into a winning coalition.
Finally, the higher the number of representatives elected for a given size of the electoral
district, the less likely that individuals will vote for sure loser parties.
As for the case of electoral participation, in order to provide an additional robustness
check we also analyze the role that di¤erent electoral systems have on communicative
voting.
[Table 10 about here]
As we mentioned before, the FPTP, TRS and STV subsamples contain a limited number
of observations and thus the regression do not provide consistent estimates. Neverthe-
less, we can see that the signs of the main explanatory variables are homogenous across
di¤erent electoral systems. Moreover, in the case of MMS and PR where the number
of observations is su¢ ciently high to have consistent estimates, the overall results are in
line with what we found when pooling all of the observations from di¤erent countries and
electoral systems (see Table 8).
In order to better explore the role of country-level variables on communicative voting,
we also performed an empirical analysis that accounts for the heterogeneity of media
market characteristics and of institutional characteristics within countries that share a
proportional system of representation. The following table reports the results of this
empirical specication:
[Table 11 about here]
We can see that, within countries sharing a PR system, higher levels of media freedom and
media concentration both decrease the probability of communicative voting. As expected,
the presence of a winner-takes-all system also decreases the probability of voting for a
sure loser party. Vice-versa, a higher threshold for representation increases the votes for
sure loser party. A 1% increase in the representation threshold increases communicative
voting by 0.4% to 1.8 depending on the specication. Such results suggest that voters
respond to an increase in the representation threshold by voting more often for sure
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loser parties in order to ensure that such parties will be represented in the political
system. Finally, as for the case of the whole sample where we considered all individuals
in di¤erent electoral systems together, a higher concentration of opposition parties and
a higher number of elected representatives for a given size of the electoral district, both
lead to a lower probability of voting as communicating.
4.2.3 The Role of Political Preferences
Di¤erences in political preferences seem to play a signicative role in the likelihood of
voting as communicating. Right-wing extremists are more likely to vote strategically for
a likely winner party than are moderate voters. On the other hand, leftist extremists
do not behave statistically di¤erently from moderate voters. A possible explanation of
this asymmetry between the behavior of left-wing and right-wing extremists may lie in
the presence of a supply e¤ect. In some of the countries in our sample, there are no
extreme-right loser parties and/or extreme-left loser parties. Since in such cases extremist
voters have a restricted choice set, the results may be a¤ected by this supply e¤ect.
However, restricting our sample to countries that only have extremist loser parties does
not change our results in any signicant way (see table A4.2 in Appendix 4). Hence, such
a supply e¤ectdoes not seem to account for the presence of this asymmetry.16
Voters displaying preferences closer to the platform of a sure loser party show a greater
probability of casting a communicative vote (beingCSLP increases the probability of com-
municative voting by 3.6% to 10% depending on the empirical specication). This nding
seems to suggest the presence of sincere voting even by individuals whose ideologically-
closer party is a sure loser. To better understand and explore the role of such political
preferences on communicative voting, analogously to what we have done for our empiri-
cal analysis of electoral participation, we report in Table 12 the results of the three-stage
electoral choice model. We consider the empirical results regarding the determinants of
communicative voting for the subsamples of individuals closer to a sure loser party
(CSLP) and closer to a likely winner party(CLWP), respectively.
[Table 12 about here]
Most of the results of communicative voting in the CSLP and CLWP subsamples are
similar to those obtained in the two-stage electoral choice model. Education and protest
voting continue to play an important role in determining communicative voting. As
before, right-wing extremists seem to be very strategic: they are more likely to vote for a
likely winner party than moderate voters, regardless of whether their preferred party is a
16Obviously, understanding the di¤erent rationales behind the electoral behavior of right and left wing
extremists is beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, we believe that documenting this empirical
nding may prove useful for future theoretical and empirical research.
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likely winner (when they are CLWP) or a sure loser (when they are CSLP). In contrast,
left-wing extremists are more likely to vote for a winner party than moderate voters when
their preferred party is a likely winner, and more likely to vote for a loser party when
their preferred party is a sure loser. This result seems to suggest that leftist extremists
are more likely to vote sincerely, regardless of whether their preferred party is a winner
or a loser.
As in the case of electoral participation, the functioning of the media system seems to
exercise di¤erent e¤ects on CSLP and CLWP voters. A lower level of media freedom is
associated with a higher probability of communicative voting by CSLP voters. On the
other hand, the higher the concentration in the market for news, the more likely that
CLWP individuals will vote strategically. Again, we can interpret this result in the light
of Oberholzer-Gee and Waldfogel (2005). A higher concentration in the market for news
implies that larger groups and thus larger (likely winner) parties are more represented.
Smaller (likely loser) parties will nd less space in the media and thus, ceteris paribus,
people will be less inclined to vote for them.
As in the two stage model, a higher concentration of opposition parties and a higher
number of elected representatives for a given size of the electoral district leads to a higher
probability of voting strategically especially in the CSLP subsample.
5 Conclusions
Elections are a decision mechanism where voters are involved in two di¤erent choices.
Voters face a participation decision in which they must choose whether to go to the
polling stations and cast their vote. At the same time, they face a voting decision in
which they have to decide whom to vote for.
We constructed a unied empirical framework in which both the participation decision
and the voting decision are taken into account. We proposed two alternative specications
of the electoral decision process. The rst is a two-stage decision process where the
individual makes a participation and a voting decision. The second is characterized by
a three-stage structure where, prior to making the above two electoral decisions, the
individual takes into account the fact that her preferred party is either a likely winner or
a sure loser.
Our main ndings can be summarized as follows. The evidence regarding the role of
information shows that individuals who are either independent or uninformed are less
likely to turn out. However, being both independent and uninformed does not have
a statistically signicant e¤ect on electoral participation. Hence, our results seem to
question the empirical relevance of the swing voters curse theory of abstentionism in
large elections. Second, the probability of individual turnout is lower in the presence of a
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lower level of media freedom, a higher threshold for political representation, and a lower
number of representatives for a given size of the electoral district. On the other hand, the
probability of voting as communicating is higher in the presence of a lower media freedom
and a lower concentration of opposition parties. We also show that individual preferences
a¤ect both the participation and voting decisions. The probability of abstentionism
and of communicative voting is lower for individuals whose ideologically-closer party
is a likely winner, who consider politics important, and who have a good opinion of
the political system of their country. Left-wing extremists are more likely to vote for
their most preferred party regardless of whether this party is a sure loser, while right-
wing extremists are very strategic (even more strategic than moderate voters). We also
nd evidence supporting the recent theoretical literature on communicative voting which
suggests that voting for sure loser parties may indeed reect forward-looking behavior
(Piketty, 2000, Castanheira, 2003, Razin, 2003): better-educated people are more likely
to vote as communicating, rather than strategically.
Finally, we have pointed out how the characteristics of the electoral system and of the
media market of a country have di¤erent e¤ects on the behavior of individuals with di¤er-
ent preferences. More specically, the incentives to turn out and vote as communicating
of individuals whose ideologically-closer party is a likely winner are a¤ected di¤erently
by variation in institutional characteristics with respect to those of individuals whose
ideologically-closer party is a sure loser. Therefore, we believe that our ndings on the
di¤erent impact that institutional characteristics may have on the incentives of di¤erent
individuals to turn out and vote as communicating suggest that future research should
focus on this issue. Specically, exploiting a dataset that provides a direct measure of
individual party identication and individual votes across di¤erent countries may help
to better understand the important link between individual preferences and institutional
characteristics. This line of research may help guide public policies aimed at inuencing
electoral participation and/or communicative voting in di¤erent countries.
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APPENDIX 1
The Data
The main data source used in our empirical investigation is the World Value Survey
(1999-2002). This data collection represents the fourth and most recent wave carried out
by the World Values Survey and European Values Survey groups. The surveys covers
60 countries and are representative of the universe of all adults aged 18 or above. Each
individual has two corresponding weight attached. The rst one is a national level post-
stratication weight. In other words, it is the weight attached to the individual to correct
the sample to reect the national distribution of individuals.17 The second one is a post-
stratication weight to correct for the fact that some countries have much bigger samples
than others, and their sizes are not related to the relative size of their population. In
other words, this second weight allows analyzing the behavior of individuals belonging to
national di¤erent surveys. Since our dataset contains individuals of 14 di¤erent European
countries, we use this cross-national weight in our empirical study.
The 14 European countries under investigation in our study are the following: Austria,
Denmark, Belgium, Netherlands, Sweden, Finland, Portugal, Spain, Greece, Germany,
Italy, France, United Kingdom and Ireland. The second data source that we employ in
our analysis is drawn from Koole and Katz (2000). More specically, we have analyzed
the information contained in there to classify each party in each of the 14 countries as a
sure loseror a likely winner. The third data set we use is the Mark and Steenbergen
(1999) expert survey on the position of parties on the left-right scale in the 14 countries
under analysis. To capture the functioning of the media market in the country where
the individual is eligible to vote we have used the information contained in the Press
freedom 1994-2001released by The Freedom House and the Herndahl Index of media
concentration contained Sanchez-Tabernero (2004). Finally, we used the Database of
Political Institutions (DPI 2004) of the World Bank to construct the variables regarding
the institutional characteristics of each country.
[Table A1.1 about here: Description of variables]
[Table A1.2 about here: Summary statistics]
17For example, if the sample contains twice as many university-educated respondents as there are in
the adult population as a whole, members of this group are given a weight of 0.5.
22
APPENDIX 2
Small-Hsiao Tests of IIA Assumptions in Multinomial Logit Model
Table A2.1 reports the results of the Small-Hsiao tests of the IIA assumption over the
fully specied Multinomial Logit model for the two stage electoral choice model.18
[Table A2.1 about here]
Tables A2.2 and A2.3 report the results of the Small-Hsiao tests of the IIA assumption
over the fully specied Multinomial Logit model for the three stage electoral choice model,
relative to the subsamples of CSLP and CLWP voters, respectively.
[Tables A2.2 and A2.3 about here]
APPENDIX 3
Robustness Checks on the Swing Voters Curse
Table A3.1 reports the results of the robustness checks on the test on the swing voters
curse for di¤erent specications of swinger voters (only independents, no moderates) and
di¤erent specication of informativeness. The results of these robustness checks are not
supporting the theoretical prediction. Indeed, being independent and uninformed seems
actually to be positively correlated with the probability of turnout.
[Table A3.1 about here]
In Table A3.2 we report the numbers and the percentage of moderate/independent voters
who are also uninformed in all the di¤erent specications of our test of the swing voters
curse.
[Table A3.2 about here]
18The Small-Hsiao test avoids both the asymptotic bias of the likelihood ratio test originally suggested
by McFadden, Train and Tye, and the matrix manipulation and inversion required for the Hausman-type
test recently suggested by Hausman and McFadden(Small and Hsiao (1985); pg. 625).
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APPENDIX 4
Robustness Checks on di¤erent countries subsamples
In this appendix, we perform some robustness checks on electoral participation and
communicative voting on di¤erent countries subsamples. First, we exclude from our
sample all the countries where the di¤erence between the average turnout in the two
closest elections and the sample turnout is higher than 10% (i.e., Finland, France, Ireland,
Netherlands and Portugal). Table A4.1. reports the regression results on abstention and
communicative voting for the fully specied nested logit model on this subsample.
[Table A4.1 about here]
As a second robustness check of our results we exclude from our sample all the countries
where there are no extreme loser parties (either on the left or on the right of the political
spectrum) (i.e., Austria, Ireland, Finland, Spain, Sweden, Belgium). Table A4.2. reports
the regression results on communicative voting for the fully specied nested logit model
on this subsample.
[Table A4.2 about here]
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Figure 1: The Two-Stage Electoral Choice Model
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Figure 2: The Three-Stage Electoral Choice Model
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Voters Abstentionists
Average level of information about
politics : 1 (highest) to 5 (lowest)
1.910 2.510 Prob > |t| = 0,0000
Average level of importance given to
politics: 1 (highest) to 4 (lowest)
2.690 3.110 Prob > |t| = 0,0000
Average valuation of the political system
(1 to 10)
5.490 4.900 Prob > |t| = 0,0000
Percentage of women 51.56% 60.95% Prob > |t| = 0,0000
 Average age 46.150 42.024 Prob > |t| = 0,0000
 Average level of education  (1 to 8) 4.400 4.230 Prob > |t| = 0,0001
 Average level of income (1 to 10) 5.200 4.670 Prob > |t| = 0,0000
Percentage of individuals closer to a
“sure loser” party (CSLP )
37.58% 44.94% Prob > |t| = 0,0000
Percentage of individuals closer to a
“likely winner” party (CLWP )
62.45% 55.14% Prob > |t| = 0,0000
Percentage of moderates 38.65% 46.94% Prob > |t| = 0,0000
Percentage of independents 6.32% 25.16% Prob > |t| = 0,0000
Percentage of independents or
moderates
44.88% 72.38% Prob > |t| = 0,0000
t-test
H0: Vectors of means are
equal for the two samples
Table 1. Voters and abstentionists
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Table 2. Communicative and strategic voters
Strategic Voters CommunicativeVoters
Average level of information about
politics : 1 (highest) to 5 (lowest)
1.900 1.960 Prob > |t| = 0,0395
Average level of importance given to
politics (1 to 4)
2.699 2.670 Prob > |t| = 0,1849
Average valuation of the political system
(1 to 10)
5.630 4.900 Prob > |t| = 0,0000
Percentage of women 51.38% 52.33% Prob > |t| = 0,3910
Average age 46.770 43.460 Prob > |t| = 0,0000
Average level of education  (1 to 8) 4.280 4.890 Prob >|t| = 0,0000
Average level of income (1 to 10) 5.210 5.170 Prob > |t| = 0,5601
Percentage of individuals closer to a
“sure loser” party (CSLP )
34.78% 49.80% Prob > |t| = 0,0000
Percentage of individuals closer to a
“likely winner” party (CLWP )
65.27% 50.18% Prob > |t| = 0,0000
Percentage of independents or
moderates
44.78% 45.33% Prob > |t| = 0.6161
Percentage of Leftist extremists 7.20% 11.59% Prob > |t| = 0,0000
Percentage of Rightist Extremists 12.28% 11.90% Prob > |t| = 0.5987
t-test
H0: Vectors of means are
equal for the two samples
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SL SL SL SL SL NL
High level of education 0.108 -0.0113 -0.0509 0.0767 0.0694 0.158*
(0.0723) (0.0769) (0.0726) (0.0743) (0.0744) (0.0808)
High level of income -0.481*** -0.294*** -0.387*** -0.332*** -0.330*** -0.437***
(0.111) (0.114) (0.112) (0.112) (0.112) (0.134)
-0.551*** -0.455*** -0.452*** -0.438*** -0.784***
(0.0505) (0.0534) (0.0523) (0.0524) (0.0824)
Believe politics is important -0.630*** -0.586*** -0.603*** -0.596*** -0.611***
(0.0593) (0.0603) (0.0606) (0.0605) (0.0724)
Uninformed about politics 0.385*** 0.495*** 0.662*** 0.467*** 0.468*** 0.651***
(0.117) (0.119) (0.115) (0.120) (0.120) (0.140)
Moderate or independent 0.965*** 1.036*** 1.059*** 0.973*** 1.004*** 0.963***
(0.0590) (0.0613) (0.0595) (0.0596) (0.0602) (0.0604)
0.0441 0.0841 -0.00620 0.0405 0.0226 -0.0159
(0.132) (0.134) (0.132) (0.135) (0.135) (0.135)
Closer to sure loser party 0.291*** 0.194*** 0.295*** 0.244*** 0.643***
(0.0491) (0.0546) (0.0495) (0.0503) (0.0857)
Inverse index media freedom 0.0282*** 0.0221*** 0.0243*** 0.0428***
(0.00524) (0.00538) (0.00545) (0.00742)
HH index of media concentration -0.0370 -0.0183 -0.0189 -0.145***
(0.0326) (0.0333) (0.0329) (0.0456)
Winner-takes-all system 0.0886 0.125 0.0957 0.220*
(0.0889) (0.0907) (0.0915) (0.128)
Threshold for representation 0.0743*** 0.0764*** 0.0747*** 0.0632***
(0.0165) (0.0168) (0.0168) (0.0221)
-0.00433 0.146 0.0476 -2.036***
(0.217) (0.220) (0.221) (0.497)
Mean district magnitude -0.00638*** -0.00479*** -0.00474*** -0.00802***
(0.00103) (0.00105) (0.00105) (0.00128)
Country-specific dummies NO YES NO NO NO NO
Log Likelihood -7208.13 -7003.38 -7224.95 -7088.59 -7073.31 -9264.44
Observations 16555 16555 16555 16555 16555 16555
0.114 0.140 0.112 0.129 0.131
 80.76 80.22 80.07 80.48 80.50 94.67
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note. Dependent variable is whether the individual would not vote in a general election. All regression include age, gender,
size of urban area, employment and marital status dummies. Robust standard errors in parentheses
Good opinion about political system
Moderate or independent *
uninformed
Table 3. Abstention
Herfindahl index of opposition parties
Pseudo R2
Percentage of correct predictions
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SL NL
High level of education 0.00917 0.0216*
High level of income -0.0391*** -0.0224***
Good opinion about political system -0.0568*** -0.0283***
Believe politics is important -0.0740*** -0.0204***
Uninformed about politics 0.0671*** 0.0451***
Moderate or independent 0.131*** 0.045***
Moderate or independent *
uninformed
0.00296 -0.0009
Closer to sure loser party 0.0325*** 0.0435***
Inverse index media freedom 0.00317*** 0.0093***
HH index of media concentration -0.00246 -0.0027***
Winner-takes-all system 0.0125 0.0138
Threshold for representation 0.00973*** 0.004***
Herfindahl index of opposition parties 0.0062 -0.0003***
Mean district magnitude -0.000618*** -0.0101***
Observations 16555 16555
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4. Marginal Effects Abstention
Note. Dependent variable is whether the individual would not vote in a general
election. All regression include age, gender, size of urban area, employment and
marital status dummies.
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Coefficients
Marginal
Effects Coefficients
Marginal
Effects
High level of education 0.0677 0.0081 0.185 0.0109
(0.0986) (0.121)
High level of income -0.253* -0.0278 -0.294** -0.0150
(0.140) (0.149)
Good opinion about political system -0.523*** -0.0620 -0.709*** -0.0215
(0.0680) (0.101)
Believe politics is important -0.491*** -0.0557 -0.474*** -0.0158
(0.0787) (0.0823)
Uninformed about politics 0.519*** 0.0690 0.587*** 0.0379
(0.151) (0.160)
Moderate or independent 1.015*** 0.1230 0.978*** 0.0438
(0.0796) (0.0798)
0.189 0.0235 0.202 0.0125
(0.169) (0.168)
Closer to sure loser party 0.115* 0.0137 0.315*** 0.0176
(0.0680) (0.122)
Inverse index media freedom 0.0758*** 0.0089 0.114*** 0.0278
(0.0107) (0.0243)
HH index of media concentration 0.555*** 0.0654 0.0983 0.0141
(0.186) (0.320)
Winner-takes-all system 1.173*** 0.1760 0.0702 -0.0090
(0.384) (0.735)
Threshold for representation -0.0230 -0.0027 0.0589 0.0037
(0.0313) (0.0544)
Herfindahl index of opposition parties -3.544*** -0.4180 -3.403*** -0.0243
(0.870) (0.895)
Mean district magnitude -0.00653*** -0.0008 -0.00942*** -0.0164
(0.00116) (0.00195)
Log Likelihood -4103.87 -5815.10
Observations 10252 10252
0.153
Percentage of correct predictions 80.72 94.36
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
SL NL
Note. Dependent variable is whether the individual would not vote in a general election. All regression
include age, gender, size of urban area, employment and marital status dummies. Robust standard errors in
parentheses
Table 6. Abstention in Countries with Proportional Voting
Pseudo R2
Moderate or independent *
uninformed
35
SL NL SL NL
High level of education -0.0274 0.670** 0.110 0.250**
(0.116) (0.273) (0.0968) (0.126)
High level of income -0.230 -0.376 -0.376** -0.450***
(0.169) (0.279) (0.150) (0.163)
-0.403*** -1.014*** -0.473*** -0.695***
(0.0817) (0.185) (0.0684) (0.138)
Believe politics is important -0.545*** -0.435*** -0.612*** -0.647***
(0.0976) (0.154) (0.0771) (0.0847)
Uninformed about politics 0.435** 0.628*** 0.521*** 0.615***
(0.192) (0.237) (0.150) (0.173)
Moderate or independent 1.358*** 1.330*** 0.878*** 0.890***
(0.108) (0.112) (0.0785) (0.0790)
-0.0846 -0.108 0.0378 0.0345
(0.211) (0.209) (0.172) (0.171)
Inverse index media freedom 0.0712*** 0.153*** -0.00426 -0.00192
(0.0107) (0.0314) (0.00728) (0.00825)
HH index of media concentration -0.0739 -0.268** -0.123** -0.227***
(0.0492) (0.112) (0.0509) (0.0710)
Winner-takes-all system -0.0962 -0.596** 0.149 0.445*
(0.177) (0.301) (0.112) (0.242)
Threshold for representation 0.0170 0.115** 0.116*** 0.0762**
(0.0289) (0.0566) (0.0218) (0.0379)
-1.130*** -6.335*** 1.500*** 0.634
(0.311) (1.853) (0.343) (0.746)
Mean district magnitude -0.00346* -0.0145*** -0.00452*** -0.00549***
(0.00184) (0.00397) (0.00133) (0.00149)
Log Likelihood -2945.83 -3686.16 -4097.83 -5485.69
Observations 6462 6462 10093 10093
Pseudo R2 0.152 0.122
Percentage of correct predictions 78.74 89.8 82.1 96.89
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 7. Abstention -  Subsamples of CSLP  and CLWP  voters
Note. Dependent variable is whether the individual would not vote in a general election. All regression
include age, gender, size of urban area, employment and marital status dummies. Robust standard errors in
parentheses
Subsample of  “Closer to
Likely Winner Party” voters
(CLWP )
  Subsample of  “Closer to
Sure Loser Party” voters
(CSLP )
Good opinion about political system
Moderate or independent *
uninformed
Herfindahl index of opposition parties
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
SL SL SL SL NL
Middle level of education 0.318*** 0.163** 0.317*** 0.282*** 0.856***
(0.0678) (0.0713) (0.0677) (0.0685) (0.262)
High level of education 0.508*** 0.289*** 0.427*** 0.391*** 1.115***
(0.0757) (0.0808) (0.0769) (0.0776) (0.323)
High level of income -0.164 -0.137 -0.0924 -0.122 -0.580
(0.111) (0.113) (0.112) (0.112) (0.383)
-0.620*** -0.494*** -0.498*** -0.482*** -1.632***
(0.0544) (0.0575) (0.0559) (0.0563) (0.339)
Believe politics is important 0.0277 0.00782 0.000720 0.0158 -0.0727
(0.0577) (0.0591) (0.0581) (0.0586) (0.189)
Uninformed about politics 0.222*** 0.201** 0.224*** 0.215*** 0.798***
(0.0761) (0.0810) (0.0768) (0.0782) (0.297)
Left-wing extremist 0.155* 0.205** 0.413*** 0.101 0.169
(0.0864) (0.0867) (0.0875) (0.0876) (0.250)
Right-wing extremist -0.260*** -0.300*** -0.0437 -0.335*** -1.763***
(0.0842) (0.0917) (0.0849) (0.0880) (0.366)
Closer to sure loser party 0.665*** 0.544*** 0.719*** 2.286***
(0.0539) (0.0605) (0.0570) (0.398)
Inverse index media freedom 0.0419*** 0.0474*** 0.108***
(0.00613) (0.00630) (0.0237)
HH index of media concentration -0.0873** -0.0623 -0.452***
(0.0393) (0.0385) (0.134)
Winner-takes-all system 0.158 0.0805 0.925*
(0.106) (0.110) (0.514)
Threshold for representation -0.0358* -0.0417** -0.0902
(0.0195) (0.0194) (0.0702)
Herfindahl index opposition parties
-2.728*** -3.168*** -11.78***
(0.256) (0.257) (2.352)
Mean district magnitude -0.00411*** -0.00462*** -0.0164***
(0.000861) (0.000877) (0.00397)
Country-specific dummies NO YES NO NO NO
Log Likelihood -5843.71 -5622.40 -5828.67 -5732.02 -9264.44
Observations 13175 13175 13175 13175 13175
0.0528 0.0886 0.0552 0.0709
Percentage of correct predictions 81.3 81.6 81.3 81.3 90.25
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note. Dependent variable is whether the individual would vote for a “sure loser party” in a general election. All
regression include age, gender, size of urban area, employment and marital status dummies. Robust standard
errors in parentheses
Good opinion about political system
Table 8. Communicative Voting
Pseudo R2
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SL NL
High level of education 0.0555*** 0.0202***
High level of income -0.0156 -0.0248
Good opinion about political system -0.0641*** -0.0182***
Believe politics is important 0.0021 -0.0261
Uninformed about politics 0.0299*** 0.0436***
Left-wing extremist 0.0138 -0.00001
Right-wing extremist -0.0406*** -0.0006***
Closer to sure loser party 0.103*** 0.0366***
Inverse index media freedom 0.00627*** 0.0221***
HH index of media concentration -0.0082 -0.0079***
Winner-takes-all system 0.0107 0.009*
Threshold for representation -0.00551** 0.0045
Herfindahl index of opposition parties -0.418*** -0.0215***
Mean district magnitude -0.00061*** -0.0195***
Observations 13175 13175
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note. Dependent variable is whether individual would vote for a “sure loser party” in a
general election. All regression include age, gender, size of urban area, employment
and marital status dummies. Robust standard errors in parentheses
Table 9. Marginal Effects Communicative Voting
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Table 11. Communicative Voting in Countries with Proportional Voting
Coefficients
Marginal
Effects Coefficients
Marginal
Effects
High level of education 0.353*** 0.0480 0.486 0.0087
(0.100) (0.305)
High level of income -0.0801 -0.0101 -0.173 -0.0164
(0.135) (0.226)
Good opinion about political system -0.414*** -0.0537 -0.696* -0.0120
(0.0706) (0.403)
Believe politics is important 0.0771 0.00993 0.0668 -0.0211
(0.0746) (0.115)
Uninformed about politics 0.206** 0.0278 0.367 0.0360
(0.103) (0.298)
Left-wing extremist 0.251** 0.0347 0.244 -0.0003
(0.110) (0.170)
Right-wing extremist -0.282** -0.0335 -0.680 0.0009
(0.114) (0.496)
Closer to sure loser party 0.690*** 0.0939 1.039* 0.0086
(0.0705) (0.544)
Inverse index media freedom 0.145*** 0.0187 0.206* 0.0784
(0.0138) (0.106)
HH index of media concentration -0.479** -0.0614 -1.256* -0.0070
(0.191) (0.730)
Winner-takes-all system -1.941*** -0.1640 -3.775* 0.0259
(0.413) (2.060)
Threshold for representation 0.142*** 0.0182 0.301* 0.004
(0.0331) (0.179)
Herfindahl index of opposition parties -3.539*** -0.4540 -3.676* -0.0452
(0.925) (2.169)
Mean district magnitude -0.00817*** -0.0011 -0.0131* -0.034
(0.000973) (0.00714)
Log Likelihood -3517.24 -5815.10
Observations 8304 8304
0.0943
80.72 90.67
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
SL NL
Note. Dependent variable is whether the individual would vote for a “sure loser party” in a general
election. All regression include age, gender, size of urban area, employment and marital status dummies.
Robust standard errors in parentheses
Pseudo R2
Percentage of correct predictions
40
SL NL SL NL
Middle level of education 0.253** 1.487** 0.285*** 0.644
(0.1000) (0.647) (0.0960) (0.417)
High level of education 0.416*** 2.374*** 0.386*** 0.763
(0.120) (0.896) (0.103) (0.482)
High level of income -0.0410 -0.616 -0.188 -0.476
(0.169) (0.828) (0.154) (0.430)
-0.510*** -2.238*** -0.498*** -1.283*
(0.0848) (0.662) (0.0772) (0.779)
Believe politics is important 0.129 0.350 -0.0752 -0.202
(0.0849) (0.422) (0.0821) (0.210)
Uninformed about politics 0.235** 0.774 0.193* 0.526
(0.109) (0.491) (0.112) (0.452)
Left-wing extremist 0.405*** 0.286 -0.681*** -1.163**
(0.109) (0.455) (0.222) (0.513)
Right-wing extremist -0.166 -1.577*** -0.688*** -1.601*
(0.111) (0.341) (0.198) (0.842)
Inverse index media freedom 0.0725*** 0.334*** 0.0184** 0.0150
(0.0105) (0.109) (0.00903) (0.0238)
HH index of media concentration -0.0758 -0.423 -0.206*** -0.699**
(0.0527) (0.306) (0.0646) (0.346)
Winner-takes-all system -0.631*** -1.420 0.556*** 1.692
(0.187) (1.078) (0.146) (1.287)
Threshold for representation 0.0220 0.262 -0.0870*** -0.218
(0.0296) (0.180) (0.0276) (0.163)
-3.573*** -22.91*** -1.788*** -5.016
(0.359) (7.530) (0.452) (3.751)
Mean district magnitude -0.00914*** -0.0444*** -0.00199* -0.00537
(0.00147) (0.0150) (0.00111) (0.00385)
Log Likelihood -2571.80 -3686.16 -4097.83 -5485.69
Observations 4946 4946 8229 8229
0.0736 0.0584
Percentage of correct predictions 75.41 82.11 85 94.85
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 12. Communicative Voting - Subsamples of CSLP  and CLWP  voters
Note. Dependent variable is whether the individual would vote for a “sure loser party” in a general election. All
regression include age, gender, size of urban area, employment and marital status dummies. Robust standard
errors in parentheses
Subsample of  “Closer to
Likely Winner Party” voters
(CLWP )
  Subsample of  “Closer to Sure
Loser Party” voters  (CSLP )
Good opinion about political system
Pseudo R2
Herfindahl index of opposition parties
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Table A1.1.  Description of variables
Variable Name Description Sources
Dependent variables
Abstain Dummy variable taking value 1 if the individual would not vote or
cast a  blank vote in a general election and 0 if votes
World Values Survey
(2000)
Communicative Voting Dummy variable taking value 1 if the individual would vote for a
sure loser party in a general election and 0 if she would vote for a
likely winner party.
World Values Survey
(2000) and Koole and
Katz (2000)
Socio-Economic Characteristics
Dummy variable taking value 1 if the individual highest education
attainment is high school, 0 otherwise
World Values Survey
(2000)
Dummy variable taking value 1 if the individual has attended a
university-level course, 0 otherwise
World Values Survey
(2000)
Dummy variable taking value 1 if household has an income level
between  7 and 8 in a 10 point scale (10 being the highest), 0
otherwise.
World Values Survey
(2000)
Dummy variable taking value 1 if household has an income level
higher or equal to 9 in a 10 point scale (10 being the highest), 0
otherwise.
World Values Survey
(2000)
Individual Preferences and Level of Information
Dummy variable taking value 1 if individual rates the political
system of his country above 5 in a 10 point scale (10 being the
highest), 0 otherwise.
World Values Survey
(2000)
Dummy variable taking value 1 if the individual consider politics to
be very important or rather important in her life, 0 otherwise.
World Values Survey
(2000)
Dummy variable taking value 1 if the individual follows politics in
the news less than once a week, 0 otherwise
World Values Survey
(2000)
Dummy variable taking value 1 if the individual  is moderate
(ideological position of the individual within 0.5 points of the
median of the left-right political space) or does not have a policy
position on the left-right political space (independent), 0 otherwise
World Values Survey
(2000)
Interaction term taking value 1 if individual is at the same time
uninformed about politics AND moderate or independent, 0
otherwise
World Values Survey
(2000)
Left-wing extremist Dummy variable taking value 1 if individual political position is
below 3 in a 10 point scale (1 being extreme left, 10 being extreme
right)
World Values Survey
(2000)
Right-wing extremist Dummy variable taking value 1 if individual political position is
above 8 in a 10 point scale (1 being extreme left, 10 being extreme
right)
World Values Survey
(2000)
High level of income
Middle level of education
High level of education
Middle-high level of income
Good opinion about political
system of the country
Believe politics is important
Moderate or independent *
uninformed
Uninformed about politics
Moderate or independent
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Table A1.1.  Description of variables (2)
Variable Name Description Sources
Choice Set
Closer to a “sure loser party”
party (CSLP)
Dummy variable taking value 1 if the ideologically closest party to
an individual is a “sure loser” and 0 if it is a “likely winner” party.
World Values Survey
(2000); Koole and Katz
(2000) and Marks and
Steenbergen (1999)
Media Characteristics in the Country where the Individual
Votes
Institutional Characteristics of Political System of the Country
where the Individual Votes
Winner-takes-all
Mean district magnitude
Threshold for representation
Herfindahl index of
opposition parties
Inverse index of media
Freedom
HH index of media
Concentration
The Freedom House
(2004)
Sanchez-Tabernero
(2004)
Hirschman-Herfindahl index of concentration of the media industry
Index of media freedom of the country: higher index corresponds
to a lower level of media freedom
DPI 2004, World Bank
(2004)
DPI 2004, World Bank
(2004)
DPI 2004, World Bank
(2004)
DPI 2004, World Bank
(2004)
In “plurality” systems, legislators are elected using a winner-takes-
all or first-past-the-post rule.  “1” if this system is used, 0 if it is
not.
The sum of the squared seat shares of all parties in the opposition.
The weighted average of the number of representatives elected for
a given size of electoral district.
Records the minimum vote share that a party must obtain in order
to take at least one seat in PR systems.
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Table A1.2. Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Dependent Variables
Abstentionist 16555 0.2042 0.4031 0 1
Vote for a “sure loser”  party 13175 0.1865 0.3895 0 1
Age
18 to 29 16555 0.2180 0.4129 0 1
30 to 49 16555 0.3874 0.4872 0 1
50 to 69 16555 0.2884 0.4530 0 1
Size of Urban Area where individual lives
Medium size town 16555 0.3493 0.4768 0 1
Large urban area 16555 0.3443 0.4752 0 1
Marital Status
Married 16555 0.5731 0.4946 0 1
Divorced 16555 0.0628 0.2425 0 1
Separated 16555 0.0188 0.1360 0 1
Widowed 16555 0.0775 0.2674 0 1
Employment Status
Full-time dependent 16555 0.3810 0.4857 0 1
Part-time dependent 16555 0.0838 0.2771 0 1
Self employed 16555 0.0594 0.2365 0 1
Retired 16555 0.2089 0.4066 0 1
Housewife 16555 0.1163 0.3206 0 1
Student 16555 0.0685 0.2526 0 1
Socio-Economic Characteristics
Middle level of education 16555 0.3636 0.4810 0 1
High level of education 16555 0.2174 0.4125 0 1
Middle-high level of income 16555 0.1517 0.3587 0 1
High level of income 16555 0.0887 0.2844 0 1
Percentage of women 16555 0.5347 0.4988 0 1
Individual preferences and level of information
Good opinion about political system of the country 16555 0.4680 0.4990 0 1
Believe politics is important 16555 0.3672 0.4821 0 1
Uninformed about politics 16555 0.1886 0.3912 0 1
Moderate 16556 0.4034 0.4906 0 1
Independent 16557 0.1017 0.3023 0 1
Moderate or independent 16555 0.5050 0.5000 0 1
Moderate or independent * uninformed 16555 0.1265 0.3325 0 1
Left-wing extremist 16555 0.0724 0.2591 0 1
Right-wing extremist 16555 0.1514 0.3585 0 1
Closer to a “sure loser” party (CSLP ) 16555 0.3903 0.4878 0 1
Media and Institutional Characteristics
Inverse index of media freedom 16555 17.6234 6.9511 9 30
HH index of media concentration 16555 2.8520 0.7354 1.677 4.143
Winner-takes-all system 16555 0.4970 0.5000 0 1
Threshold for representation 16555 2.4022 2.0098 0 5
Herfindahl index opposition parties 16555 0.4914 0.1367 0.27089 0.711889
Mean district magnitude 16555 16.5461 34.0512 1 150
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 Ho: Odds(Outcome-J vs Outcome-K) are independent of other alternatives
Omitted lnL(full) lnL(omit) chi2 df P>chi2
Abstention -3068.03 -2857.361 421.337 53 0.000 against Ho
Communicative
voting -3328.598 -3137.55 382.095 53 0.000 against Ho
Note. Regression includes age, gender, occupation, marital status, size of urban area, media market
and institutional characteristics dummies
Table A2.1. Small-Hsiao test for the IIA assumption - Multinomial logit - Whole sample
evidence
 Ho: Odds(Outcome-J vs Outcome-K) are independent of other alternatives
Omitted lnL(full) lnL(omit) chi2 df P>chi2
Abstention -1309.75 -1284.024 51.451 52 0.495 for Ho
Strategic voting -1326.92 -1269.235 115.235 52 0.000 against Ho
Table A2.2.  Small-Hsiao test for the IIA assumption -  Multinomial logit - Subsample of voters
closer to a sure loser party (CSLP )
evidence
Note. Regression includes age, gender, occupation, marital status, size of urban area, media market
and institutional characteristics dummies
 Ho: Odds(Outcome-J vs Outcome-K) are independent of other alternatives
Omitted lnL(full) lnL(omit) chi2 df P>chi2
Abstention -1657.857 -1544.289 227.137 52 0.000 against Ho
Strategic voting -2021.963 -1918.923 206.079 52 0.000 against Ho
Note. Regression includes age, gender, occupation, marital status, size of urban area, media market
and institutional characteristics dummies
Table A2.3. Small-Hsiao test for the IIA assumption - Multinomial logit - Subsample of voters
closer to a likely winner party (CLWP )
evidence
45
SL NL SL NL
0.582*** 0.719***
(0.0684) (0.0968)
1.438*** 1.475***
(0.0886) (0.116)
-0.499*** -0.488***
(0.142) (0.142)
0.344*** 0.537***
(0.0983) (0.116)
1.012*** 0.981***
(0.0647) (0.0651)
0.0156 -0.0452
(0.115) (0.115)
Log Likelihood -7126.50 -9301.70 -7085.34 -9267.02
16555 16555 16555 16555
0.12 0.129
80.92 94.44  80.49  94.92
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A3.1.  Estimates of Abstention - Robustness checks on the test on the swing voter's curse : alternative
definitions of swing  and uninformed voters
Note. Dependent variable is whether the individual would not vote in a general election. All regression
include age, gender, size of urban area, educational level, income level, employment and marital status, media
market and institutional characteristics dummies.  Robust standard errors are in parenthesis
Uninformed about politics
(less than several times a week)
Moderate or independent
Moderate or independent  *
uninformed
Independent  * uninformed
Uninformed about politics
(less than once a week)
Independent
Robustness Check A
Observations
Pseudo R2
Percentage of correct predictions
Robustness Check B
Informed Uniformed Informed Uniformed Informed Uniformed
Number 6266 2095 973 710 5272 3089
Percentage 74.94 25.06 57.81 42.19 63.05 36.95
Robustness Check B
of the Swing voter's curse
Table A3.2. Moderate or independent voters who are uninformed
Baseline Specification
Robustness Check  A
of the Swing voter's curse
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(1)
SL
(2)
NL
(3)
SL
(4)
NL
High level of education -0.0438 0.158 0.404*** 0.785***
(0.0916) (0.117) (0.0972) (0.299)
High level of income -0.460*** -0.507*** -0.0659 -0.186
(0.127) (0.140) (0.123) (0.264)
-0.365*** -0.589*** -0.408*** -0.852***
(0.0592) (0.0792) (0.0636) (0.249)
Believe politics is important -0.593*** -0.616*** -0.00157 -0.0882
(0.0645) (0.0730) (0.0646) (0.146)
Uninformed about politics 0.318** 0.445*** 0.236*** 0.517**
(0.128) (0.143) (0.0909) (0.231)
Moderate or independent 1.017*** 0.987***
(0.0661) (0.0660)
0.165 0.152
(0.147) (0.146)
Left-wing extremist 0.156 0.181
(0.0981) (0.195)
Right-wing extremist -0.332*** -1.078***
(0.0977) (0.372)
Closer to sure loser party 0.149*** 0.417*** 0.635*** 1.334***
(0.0571) (0.0904) (0.0689) (0.357)
Inverse index media freedom 0.0438*** 0.0711*** 0.0680*** 0.116***
(0.00887) (0.0124) (0.0104) (0.0350)
HH index of media concentration -0.272*** -0.439*** -0.215*** -0.594***
(0.0480) (0.0670) (0.0528) (0.180)
Winner-takes-all system -0.0132 -0.195 -0.282 -0.769*
(0.161) (0.173) (0.175) (0.434)
Threshold for representation 0.184*** 0.214*** 0.00797 0.124*
(0.0358) (0.0369) (0.0370) (0.0727)
Herfindal index of opposition parties -1.300*** -2.560*** -3.027*** -6.279***
(0.425) (0.582) (0.519) (1.810)
Mean district magnitude -0.0194 -0.0296* -0.0135 -0.0771*
(0.0154) (0.0163) (0.0171) (0.0409)
Log Likelihood -5308.70 -6329.96 -4383.54 -6329.96
Observations 11761 11761 9162 9162
0.127 0.0700
79.40 93.84 79.22 88.10
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A4.1. Abstention and Communicative Voting - Subsample of countries with low turnout discrepancy
Note. Dependent variable in (1) and (2) is whether the individual would not vote in a general election.
Dependent variable in (3) and (4) is whether individual would vote for a “sure loser party” in a general election.
All regression include age, gender, size of urban area, employment and marital status dummies. Robust
standard errors in parentheses
Communicative VotingAbstention
Good opinion about political system
Moderate or independent *
uninformed
Pseudo R2
Percentage of correct predictions
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High level of education 0.0414 1.304***
(0.107) (0.346)
High level of income -0.228 -0.638
(0.161) (0.444)
-0.588*** -1.887***
(0.0776) (0.276)
Believe politics is important -0.0428 -0.0705
(0.0786) (0.226)
Uninformed about politics 0.305*** 0.984***
(0.109) (0.302)
Left-wing extremist 0.516*** 0.206
(0.118) (0.283)
Right-wing extremist -0.455*** -1.962***
(0.135) (0.287)
Closer to sure loser party 0.490*** 2.660***
(0.0915) (0.299)
Inverse index media freedom 0.0150 0.122***
(0.0103) (0.0261)
HH index of media concentration -0.169*** -0.423***
(0.0454) (0.143)
Winner-takes-all system 0.261 1.189**
(0.174) (0.535)
Threshold for representation -0.0849*** -0.109
(0.0303) (0.0836)
Herfindahl index opposition parties 2.012*** -13.71***
(0.693) (1.686)
Mean district magnitude -0.000772 -0.0194***
(0.00120) (0.00390)
Log Likelihood -3201.17 -9258.44
Observations 7019 7019
0.0827
79.84  90.44
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A4.2. Communicative Voting - Subsample of countries with both extreme left
and extreme right loser parties
Note. Dependent variable is whether individual would vote for a  “sure loser party” in
a general election. All regression include age, gender, size of urban area, employment
and marital status dummies. Robust standard errors in parentheses
Communicative Voting
Good opinion about the political system
Pseudo R2
Percentage of correct predictions
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